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Summary:
The theory of cartels is extended over multiple time-periods on the assumptions
that the cartel has provided itself with an internal policing mechanism and that
price discounts below the colliisive price occur only on units sold in excess of
the cheater's quota. The amount to discount becomes a function of the probability
of being caught and punished, which probability is itself a function of, inter
alia , the extent of cheating. If the demand for the cartel's output is then
allowed to expand and contract around a secular trend, it is shown that. the
incidence of cheating and, therefore, of cartel stability varies directly with
changes in the demand for output. In the absence of entry, which compounds these
factors, an internally-enforced cartel is likely to be successful in jointly-
maximizing profits in the business upturn and to degenerate into the competitive
solution in the downtrun.
.o;
Nothing works against the success of a conspiracy so much as the wish
to make it wholly secure and certain to succeed. Such an attempt re-
quires many men, much time and very favorable conditions. And all
these in turn heighten the risk of being discovered. You see, there-
fore, how dangerous conspiracies are!
Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi (1458-1530)
The success of the international oil cartel in maintaining a non-
competitive price for crude oil in world markets has caused a renewed
interest in the problems of collusion. Almost all of the recent work
in this area has attempted to model cartel behavior in a static or com-
parative-static setting. While extremely useful insights have been
provided by this work, the case may be made that this concentration of
effort has yet to suggest the circumstances under which collusion succeeds
in deterring cheating through Internal enforcement devices. Indeed, the
literature has either ignored the possibility that colluders could pro-
tect themselves against cheating or has dismissed it as being very
unlikely. It is true that most modern successful cartels have employed
the power of the state to enforce their collusion's contracts, and
therefore, that it has been external enforcement rather than internal
enforcement which has become associated with successful collusion.
From the point of view of a cartel seeking success an appeal to
the state to enforce the cartel contract will be the recommended course
See, inter alia , D. K. Osborne, "Cartel Problems," American Economic
Review , 66 (December, 1976); David E. Mills and Kenneth G. Elzinga,
"Cartel Problems: Comment," American Economic Review , 68 (December,
1978) ; Robert S. Pindyck, "Cartel pricing and the structure of the world
bauxite market," Bell Journal of Economics, v. 8, n. 2 (Autumn, 1977);
Z. Mikdashi, "Collusion Could Work," Foreign Policy, No. 14 (1974);
and Peter Asch and J. J. Seneca, "Is Collusion Profitable?", Review of
Economics and Statistics , 58 (1976). The classic article is George J.
Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Poll tical_ Economy, 72 (1964),
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of action if that is a cheaper way to insure success than are the alter-
natives. Among those alternatives are that of simply doing without any
policing—the assumption of the simplest models—and that of privately-
supplied enforcement among the colluders. The presence of vigorous
antitrust enforcement policies has probably significantly raised the
relative price of private enforcement, but it cannot be presumed to
2have made it completely out of the question for colluders. Especially
for cartels operating across national boundaries, as does the OPEC, and
for those historical cartels which operated either before the passage
3
of statutes defining anti-competitive practices or during periods of lax
enforcement of these statutes, the attractiveness of private enforcement
may be and has been considerable.
The adoption by a cartel of internal policing mechanisms can lead
to a cyclical pattern in cartel stability. Specifically, the members
of the collusion appear to adhere to the joint-profit-maximizing price
and output decisions when business is good and to cheat when business
4
is bad. Not only has the OPEC obeyed this pattern; other collusions
5
of note have, too, e.g., the electrical equipment conspiracy and late
2
See George J. Stigler and Gary Becker, "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers," Journal of Legal Studies, v. 3, n, 1
(January, 1974), and William Landas and Richard A. Posner, "The Private
Enforcement of Law," Journal of Legal Studies, v. 4, n. 1 (January, 1975).
3
Before the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 the common law had
typically found many anti-competitive practices illegal.
4
See MIdkashi, supra n. 1, and M. A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future,
Inc., 1972).
See, e.g., "Collusion Among Electrical Equipment Manufacturers,"
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 12, 1962.
-2-
of action if that is a cheaper way to insure success than are the alter-
natives. Among those alternatives are that of simply doing without any
policing—the assumption of the simplest models—and that of privately-
supplied enforcement among the colluders. The presence of vigorous
antitrust enforcement policies has probably significantly raised the
relative price of private enforcements but it cannot be presumed to
2have made it completely out of the question for colluders. Especially
for cartels operating across national boundaries, as does the OPEC, and
for those historical cartels which operated either before the passage
of statutes defining anti-competitive practices or during periods of lax
enforcement of these statutes, the attractiveness of private enforcement
may be and has been considerable,
The adoption by a cartel of internal policing mechanisms can lead
to a cyclical pattern in cartel stability. Specifically, the members
of the collusion appear to adhere to the joint-profit-maximizing price
and output decisions when business is good and to cheat when business
4
is bad. Not only has the OPEC obeyed this pattern; other collusions
of note have, too, e.g», the electiical equipment conspiracy and late
2
See George J. Stigler and Gary Eecksr, "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers," Journal of I f^gal Studies, v. 3, n. 1
(January, 1974), and William Landeo and Richard A. F03ner, "The Private
Enforcement of Law," Journal of Legal Studies, v. 4, n. 1 (January, 1975).
3
Before the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 the common law had
typically found taany ariti-cenripetitive practices illegal.
4
See Midkashi, supra n. 1, and M. A, Adelmsn, The World Petroleum Marke t
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future,
Inc., 1972).
See, e.g., "Collusion Among Electrical Fquipment Manufacturers,"
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 12, 1952.
Nothing works against the success of a conspiracy so much as the wish
to make it wholly secure and certain to succeed. Such an attempt re-
quires many men, much time and very favorable conditions. And all
these in turn heighten the risk of being discovered. You see, there-
fore, how dangerous conspiracies are!
Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi (1458-1530)
The success of the international oil cartel in maintaining a non-
competitive price for crude oil in world markets has caused a renewed
interest in the problems of collusion. Almost all of the recent work
in this area has attempted to model cartel behavior in a static or com-
parative-static setting. While extremely useful insights have been
provided by this work, the case may be made that this concentration of
effort has yet to suggest the circumstances under which collusion succeeds
in deterring cheating through internal enforcement
__
devices. Indeed, the
literature has either ignored the possibility that colluders could pro-
tect themselves against cheating or has dismissed it as being very
unlikely. It is true that most modern successful cartels have employed
the power of the state to enforce their collusion's contracts, and
therefore, that it has been external enforcement rather than internal
enforcement which has become associated with successful collusion.
From the point of view of a cartel seeking success an appeal to
the state to enforce the cartel contract will be the recommended course
See, inter alia , D. K. Osborne, "Cartel Problems," American Economic
Review , 66 (December, 1976); David E. Mills and Kenneth G. Elzinga,
"Cartel Problems: Comment," American Economic Review , 68 (December,
1978); Robert S. Pindyck, "Cartel pricing and the structure of the world
bauxite market," Bell Journal of Economics, v. 8, n. 2 (Autumn, 1977);
Z. Mikdashi, "Collusion Could Work," Foreign Policy, No. 14 (1974);
and Peter Asch and J. J. Seneca, "Is Collusion Profitable?", Review of
Economics and Statistics. 58 (1976). The classic article Is George J.
Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72 (1964).
nineteenth century U.S. railroad cartels. It is this dynamic aspect
of cartel behavior to which this paper is addressed. In section II a
model of collusion is defined and compared to the existing models of
cartel behavior. The success of the cartel in deterring cheating over
the course of a simple expansion and contraction of the demand for the
output of the cartel is examined in section III. The concluding section
summarizes the findings and suggests their implications for a number of
fields in economics.
II.
Assume that a cartel is established with the following strategies
designed to prevent cheating: a governing agency is established to
make rules, detect cheating, hear complaints, and impose punishments.
Suppose now that an individual member, after the collusion is launched,
considers the advisability of cheating. He must now realize that the
decision to cheat is a decision to take a gamble. If he is discovered,
he runs the risk of being fined or otherwise punished. Success implies
secretly incrementing his share of cartel profits. Being a gamble, the
decision to cheat or not to cheat will depend crucially on the prob-
ability of being caught.'
See Thomas S. Ulen, Cartels and Regulation: Late Nineteenth Century
Railroad Collusion and the Creation of the Intersta te, Commerce Commission
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, 1978). Other relevant examples
are to be found in John S. McGee, "Ocean Freight Rate Conferences,"
University of Chicago_Law Review, v. 27, n. 2 (Winter, 1960) and Kenneth
G. Elzinga, "Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust,"
Journal of Law and Economics, v. 13 (1970). Also, see George W. Stocking
and Myron W. Watkins,~ Cartels in Action (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1947).
And on the conditional probability that the fine can be enforced. For
the remainder of the discussion, I make the strong assumption that the
probability of enforcement, given that the firm has been caught, is equal
to one.
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Let us assume an industry in which there are n identical firms,
where n is not too large. Each firm faces a linear demand curve, D ,
which is (l/n)th of the total industry demand. The industry, in the
absence of collusion, is assumed to be monopolistically competitive so
that each firm faces the usual second demand curve, D , which is more
elastic than the market share demand curve and is defined so as to pass
through each point on the first demand curve. I shall further assume
that a cheater in this well-structured cartel practices a particular
form of disloyalty which I shall call "cheating at the margin." By this
I mean that he offers a discount only on those units he sells above his
cartel quota. That is, he practices a form of price discrimination:
up to his quota he charges the full cartel price; it is only to the new
and stolen customers that he offers a price reduction.
This situation is indicated in the graph below, figure 1. The
cheater offers the quantity (q * - q*) at the discounted price, p *.
If he is not discovered, then his total profits are the sum of rectangles
EFCG and ABCD, which is obviously greater than his share of cartel
profits, EFCG.
The accepted theory of cartels assumes that cheating is done over
both the member's quota and over the new and stolen customers. For
comparison this strategy is also shown in the figure. The relevant
marginal revenue curve, MEL, now begins at the vertical axis since
the cheater means to offer a lower price to all of his customers. If
he then sells q * at price p *, his total profits are the rectangle
ULG. He has sacrificed the profits EFIK, which would have been his
had he remained loyal, and got in return an increase in profits equal
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to KJLC. It is evident that cheating will be irresistible so long as
KJLC > EFIK. 8
Since, in view of the precautionary measures taken by the cartel,
the decision to cheat is a gamble, we are dealing in uncertain outcomes
over which a probability density function is defined. If u(x) is a
real-valued function defined ck a set X and P(X) is a probability
distribution defined over the same set, then we may write
E(u|P) = u(x)dP(x)
and E(ufP*) - max E(u|P ), i « 1, 2, .... n.
F.
1
i
g
A word of explanation is in order for introducing "cheating at
the margin" in addition to the sort of cheating which the accepted
theory assumes. The reason for positing this new form is that is seems
to capture one of two different kinds of cheating that afflict a cartel.
Of those two kinds the first and less serious is the sniping which
margin cheating implies. It is calculated to line the cheater's coffers
but not to do mortal damage to the cartel. It can be seen that, in
general, (q * - q*) is net terribly large, at least, if the market
share demand is large, nowhere near the quantity q*. Since this margin
cheating is not very big, relative to q* and r *, it does not involve
stealing a great number of customers from the other (n-1) members.
Especially if total market demand, D
, is increasing, small losses in
loyal members 1 customers will be less evident amid the influx of new
customers. (See Stigltr, op pit. , supra n. 1, for the elucidation of
the circumstances under which a cartel nember may infer, from changes
in the growth of his market share, if one of his co-conspirators is
cheating.) The second kind of cheating is the whole-hog version. In
what follows it will be seen to be associated with a complete collapse
of the cartel. The analysis and a simulation will be developed for the
margin cheating case. It should be evident that the whole-hog variety
can be explained in the following model after appropriate substitution
of variables. A point which will shortly be developed but which bears
mentioning now is th^s: given the steps which the cartel has been
assumed to have taken, the probability of detecting a discount over q *
is greater than that over (q * - a *)
.
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It is assumed that u'(s) > 9 but there are the usual three possibilities
for the second derivative. In what follows, I shall assume that the
firms in the cartel are all risk-neutral.
The decision for each member of the collusion is whether to take
the gamble—i.e., to cheat—or to remain loyal. Therefore, each firm
must assess both the expected utility of loyalty and the expected utility
of cheating. The first quantity is assumed to prevail with probability
9
equal to one, if the firm remains loyal. Thus,
(1) «
t
= u(% - X)
where ir the firm's share of joint maximum profits,
X = the firm's contribution to the cartel governing
body, assumed constant.
The utility of cheating is a certainty equivalent:
(2) u - p. u(it - X - 6ir.) + (1 - p,)u(tt - X + it.)
c *d m i' vd m i'
where p, = the probability of detection
Tf = the profits realized on the amount discounted a t
the margin
9
It should be noted that this certainty of loyalty profits is a special
sort of assumption. Clearly if someone else is already cheating and the
prospects for the continuation of the cartel are dim, the probability
of loyalty profits is not one. In what follows I dismiss this complication
by assuming that at any point in time the firm believes everyone else
will remain loyal so that tr can be had as a sure thing.
-8-
<S « a fine parameter, assumed to be strictly greater
than 1.
I shall assume that the firm is rational in such a manner that, if
u„ > u , the firm will remain loyal to the cartel but that if u > u ,
£ c' c £
it will cheat. Since all firms are assumed to be alike, u > u^
is true, for all n enterprises, and the cartel dissolves. The situation
u
ff
> u implies that the cartel remains together or, if apart before
u„ > u obtains, comes together in a collusion which endures as long
Jt c
as that condition holds.
In some expected utility problems the probability of success is
assumed to be independent of the parameters of the utility function.
This is certainly not the case with a cheater: the decisions he
takes and those his fellows take affect the likelihood of his gamble's
succeeding. The amount which the cartel as a whole spends policing
Strictly speaking, there is a probability distribution over this fine
parameter. The probability of enforcing a fine is really a conditional
probability, given that cheating has been detected. We should expect
that p would be relatively low in the downturn, when, we shall see,
the cartel falls apart, and relatively high in the upturn. This latter
point is hypothetical but rests on the supposition that when times are
good, each firm is eager to continue sharing in the success of the cartel.
Should a cheater be caught then, the prospect of being denied a fair
quota in the future mi£ht persuade him to pay the fine and thereafter
keep his nose clean. Refusal to pay the fine has a greater expected
cost when the cartel is going along smoothly.
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m
_g_
itself directly affects ? , Clearly, the greater the quantity which the
cheater attempts to discount, the more likely he is to be discovered.
Since I am assuming that the cheater is offering :hese discounts at
the margin, there is another factor influencing the probability of
detection, viz., the size of the market share. In offering a two-part
tariff, the cheater must not only not let his business rivals hear of
the discount; he must also take pains to insure that his customers
who are paying the cartel price do not learn that there are some who
are getting a lower price. If these customers hear of the discounts,
they can threaten to reveal the disloyalty unless he gives them the
same discount. The larger is q — the number of customers being charged
the full cartel price under the assigned market share— the more likely
12it is that word of a price cut will be heard.
Against all this, the cheater can reduce the prcbability of detection
by taking special steps tc guarantee secrecy.
Stigler gives a iic<= e.'-e*3ple o* this in his "Theory of Oligopoly."
He assumes that p is che prcbability that a rival will hear of a price
reduction. Then (1 - p) is the probability that the price cut will go
undetected. If this reduction is offered to z customers, then the prob-
ability that the rival rill not hec* of this cheating is (1 - p) .
Therefore, 1 - (1 - p)
12
id the probability ihat the rival will hear of
a price reduction given to z customers. Even if p is small, say 0.01,
when z = 100, the probability of detection is 01634, and when z = 1000,
it increases to G. 99996.
12
I have not considered the different tactics which an old customer
who learns of discounts might employ. It may matter very much whether
this person goes to tha authorities or to the cheater with his infor-
mation. While this is an interesting problem in itself, I am positing
the more simple case that, whichever happens, the size of market share
is directly related to the probability of detection.
-10-
Let us assume that the cheater undertakes these evasion expenses and
that the marginal cost associated with these evasion expenses is constant.
Thus, the marginal cost of a discounted unit of output is (K + E. ),
where, as before, K is the constant marginal cost of production, and
E. is the constant marginal cost of maintaining secrecy.
We are now prepared to posit the following relationship:
(3) pd
e pd (v v *• V
where q the firms* quota calculated as Q /n where Q„
is the total industry demand
q, = the amount of output offered at a discount
nX = the total amount spent by the cartel to govern itself
E. the marginal evasion expenses incurred by the cheater.
We also expect that the partial derivatives of p.. with respect to the
arguments of the function to have the following signs:
3p 3p 3p 3p
Let us examine the expected utility from cheating and see how it
varies as some of the parameters vary. Consider first the partial of
u with respect to q .
.
3u 63ir 3p,
(4 > 3q7=^-^q7^^- X>3 + u(V -X)^
3tt 3p
+ »-Pd> 3^ U,Clr»- X)
- U(%^ X)
Bqf
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where q = the firms' quota calculated as Q /n where Q_
m is the total industry demand
q. the amount of output offered at a discount
nX = the total amount spent "by the cartel to govern itself
E. the marginal evasion expenses incurred by the cheater.
We also expect that the partial derivatives of p . with respect to the
arguments of the function to have the following signs:
9p 9p Sp, 3p.
t£ > °. ^7
>
°» mo * °' and **[ > °-
Let us examine the expected utility from cheating and see how it
varies as some of the parameters vary. Consider first the partial of
u with respect to q..
3u Sdv 3p,
<*> ^ = Pdt--3q7 U'^m- X>^-u( Trm -X) —
&7T 3pd
+ (1
~
*d> W
±
* ^ * X)
- U(irm- X) ^q7
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itself directly affects p . Clearly, £he greater the quantity which the
cheater attempts to disccunt, the more likely he is to be discovered.
Since I am assuming that the cheater is offering These discounts at
the margin, there is another factor influencing the probability of
detection, viz., the size of the market share. In offering a two-part
tariff, the cheater must not only not let his business rivals hear of
the discount^ he must also take pains to insure that his customers
who are paying the cartel price do net learn that there are some who
are getting a lower price. If these customers hear of the discounts,
they can threaten to reveal the disloyalty unless he gives them the
same discount. The larger is a —-the nunber of customers being charged
the full cartel price under the assigned market share—the more likely
it is that word of a price cut will be heard.
Against all this, th° cheater can reduce the probability of detection
by taking special seeps to guarantee secrecy.
Stigler gives a nics essfemple t.f this in his "Theory of Oligopoly."
He assuces th^t p is the probability that a rival will hoar of a price
reduction. Then (1 - p) is the probability that the price cut will go
undetected. If this reduction is effort"; to z customers, then the prob-
ability that the rival .will not heai" t\ thi : cheating is (1 - p) .
Therefore, 1 - (1 - p)
s is the probability that the rival will hear of
a price reduction given to z customers. Lven if p is small, say 0.01,
when z « 100, the probability of detection is 01634, and when z » 1000,
it increases to 0.999^6.
12
I have not coneideicd the different tactics which an old customer
who learns of discounts might employ. It iviy matter very much whether
this person goes tc the authorities or to the cheater with his infor-
mation. While this is an interesting problp-m in itself, I am positing
the more simple case that, whichever happens, the size of market share
is directly related to the probability of detection.
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3ff
(- fip . + 1 - p.) rr1 u 1 C* - X)d d oq id
This will be less than zero If and only If, granting that u' (ir - X) >
IB
3*
and that with q.* as an upper bound, —— > 0, that is, if
qi
(5) - 6pd
+ 1 - Pd
< 0, or
<5 '> Pd » FTT
The implication is that if p, < » v , » the firm will consider cheating.
Since I have assumed that 6 > 1, no firm will consider adopting cheating
unless the probability of detection is somewhat less than on-half.
This relationship is represented in the following graph, figure 2.
There is, however, no reason for believing that if p« < » • . -,
cheating will be the recommended course of action. Whether it is,
depends on the relative values of the expected utility of cheating and
the expected utility of loyalty. For example, u may look as it does
in figure 2 with the implication that it will take a further drop in
the probability of detection before u will dominate u.. For the firm
considering cheating, the problem is that it can affect this point t,
in the graph, by the amount it chooses to offer at a price cut and by
the precautions it takes to cover up these discounts.
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depends on the relative values of the expected utility of cheating and
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the probability of detection before u will dominate U.. For the firm
considering cheating, the problem is that it can affect this point t,
in the graph, by the amount it chooses to offer at a price cut and by
the precautions it takes to cover up these discounts.
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Let us now focus attention on the effects on the cartel of cyclical
fluctuations in the demand for its output. This meana the problem re-
duces to the following: given that p < . . , allow the cheater to
3u
c 13
choose q, such that -— and, therefore u is at a maximum. Theni aq. c
allow business to contract and expand to see if (u. - u ) variese
I c,max
around zero. Under risk neutrality we may take the expected utility
of cheating to be
(6) u -= p,(ir - X - fin.) + (1 - P ,)(tt - X + tt.)v
' c
rd m i d m i
= *
m
- X + 1T
i
[l - pd (6 +1)]
That is, we are simply talking about expected profit. We wish to see
what q. maximizes this expectation. Thus,
3u 3tt. Sp, 3tt.
c i /.
. ,x r d . ii
«> 3t-^7- (5 + 1)I"iK' + p<i^:1
where ir. is defined in the appendix. We have only a general form for
Pd »
e.g.,
(8) p. - (1 + e^ q "^ q
"B2 CnX)-63 E^)"1
from which
(9) ^- 3 2Z q±
-P2-la + e^O ^-*l qi
-»2 (BX) -e 3 Ei
-6,r2
9q1
where
(10) Z = e
_8
° q "^(nX)"03 E.~6\m l
13 it can easily be shown that the second-order condition is satisfied
in what follows.
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Therefore the solution for q * is the solution of the polynomial
(a - K - 2E ) (a - K - 2E )
(11) _ L_ _ 2Yqi - (6 + 1)[{
- ±- q ±
- yq^}
W^ 2'1
a + m**4£**q**z .„.)
a *^ K * ^E,
(—"~"
~ 2Yqi)3
=
°
It is clear thus far that only in the extreme instance where p, =
will the solution give the familiar MR. ~ MC solution,
(a - K - 2E
±
)
1
q * *= 7 ——j from the full certainty situation, still allowing
for evasion expenses. It is also certain that when p, ^ 0, the solution
will give some q. < q *. That is, the cheater will reduce the amount
offered at a discount as the probability of detection increases. What,
for example, will give the maximum utility when p, 1? In that case
the optimal q. is the solution to
o - K - 2E. (a - K - 2E.) ,
,
(12) _i - 2Yqi - (8 + 1)[{- g \ ~ ™i> 8 2Zqi
a - K - 2E
+-_ i-2Yq.3 =0.
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It can be seen that if 3„ « 0, i.e., if the amount offered at a discount
has no effect on the probability of detection, then the optimal q, when
a - K - 2E
±
p, 1, is again q * = j , the same value as when p, » 0. For
14
32 4 we suspect that q < q *. In the absence of estimates,
we won't know precisely what $_ is. In order, however, to have some
suggestions at hand, I shall make the rather strong assumption that
3„ 0. This assures us, as we have seen, that no matter what the
probability of detection, the optimal quantity to discount is q *.
We can verify this, in the absence of an estimate, 2 , *? picking
some arbitrary value of £„, say jL» 1-, In that case the optimal
value of q, is the solution to
(13) 4SYqA
2
- q±
[<S(a - K - 2E
±
) - 2Y (6 + 1)2]
- (« + l)(a - K - 2Ei)Z
«=
Using the quadratic formula,
(14)
«l,opt
"
6(a-K-2E
i)-2Y(«+l)Z ± /[5(a-K-2Ei)-2Y(6+l)Zl
2
-166Y(«+l) (a-K-^E^Z
a - K - 2E
Since q * = r
—
~, it is clear that of the two roots, q±
+
and q± -, q±
* > q± t
~. It is easily shown also that q±* > q1>opt
+
'
It is also obvious, from inspection, that the larger is fl 2 » tne smaller
when p, 1, is the optimal amount of discount.
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Later, I shall indicate what results need to be altered in the more
likely event that &. f 0.
III.
Let us now see what happens to the decision to cheat as the prob-
ability of detection fluctuates, with other variables, over the business
cycle. I shall assume that the business cycle as it affects the cartel
is exogenously generated and takes the form of periodic fluctuations in
the exogenous component of the demand curve, p » a - gq , facing each
firm in the cartel. Let this exogenous component, a, move according
to the following;
(15) a Acoswt + rt +
«m<
0)
where r «= the secular growth rate of demand for the cartel output
and ci (0) = demand at time t = 0.
The period of the cycle is given by T —, the amplitude by A, as in
figure 3.
To simplify matters, assume that r 0, that is, there is no secular
growth in demand, and that, as before, the utility functions are simply
linear, so that we are dealing only in expected profits. Thus,
(Acoswt + o (0) - K)
(16) ^ m _r
_ . x
And similarly for the expected profit from cheating. In order to deter-
mine where these functions achieve maxima and minima, we need to know
the first and second derivatives with respect to time. Begin with u..
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q (0) + A
m
a = Acos wt + rt + q (0)
m
q = rt + q (0)
ti/2co tt/oj 3ir/2a> 2ir/w
Figure 3
u
Z t max '--
Figure A
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9u -2Aws±mot (Acostot + q (0) - K)
<17
> V =W- = 48—-
At either a maximum or a minimum u ' 9 so that
(18) simot(Acostot + a (0) - K) - 0.
Clearly this is satisfied when either sincot - or Acosuit + £L,(0) - K » 0.
The second possibility cannot be allowed since it implies that the share
of monopoly profits is zero. Thus, values of t which satisfy sinut =
are the values which tell us about the extreme of u
?
. Sinwt for the
ir 2if 3ir 2ir
series t = 0, —, —, —- ... Since the period of the oscillation is —
,
we can distinguish ail maxima and minima simply by evaluating the second
derivative at t and t —, It is easilv shown that u„ is at a
to £
27T 7T 3tT
maximum at t = t — and so on and at a minimum at t = —, —^ and
to to* w
so on. The path is seen in Figure 5.
Now the crucial question is how this time path compares with that
of u
. Unfortunately, we can tell in only the most schematized way.
The time path of u depends on the changing weights assigned to success
and failure, that is, to the values, over time, of the probability of
detection. Without the values of the parameters 6ns ..., 8,, we cannot
be certain how p, moves. Note that since we have some idea about how
o and q. move over the cycle, we know, through the priors we have on
the partial derivatives of p
rf
with respect to the arguments, that p.
moves pro-cyclically. That is, it is high when business Is good and
low when business is bad. This means that u will be at its maximum
c
when business Is bad—the lesser weight being given to failure—and at
9u ~2Aa}sintt)t (Acostut + q (0) - K)
(17) Uj* - jjt- = Tf~~~
~~~
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a = Acos tot + rt + q (0)
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its minimum— the lesser weight being given to success—when business
is good. First, rewrite u as follows:
c
(19) u
c
m p^ - X - «ir± ) + (1 - pd)(TT ffi - X + ir 1 )
= u^ + tr
± il
- pd
(6 + 1)]
This formulation emphasizes the crucial role played p.. Clearly if
ir
±
[l - pd (fi
+ 1)] > 0; u
c
> u
£ .
And u
£
> u
c
if »
±
[1 - pd (<5
+ 1)] < 0.
Since ir > 0, the following is true,
(20) ^ = uc as pd | j^y
In order to see this more fully posit that p , moves in the following
way:
(21) pd
= |(cos«st + 1)
and further assume that the fine parameter 6=1. The first assumption
certainly overstates the case. It implies that detection is a certainty
at the peak of the cycle and an impossibility at the trough, as in
figure 4. We can new simplify our expression for u
,
c
(22) 1 - p,(5 + 1) - 1 - -kcosoit + 1)2 - -coeut.
Therefore,
2 2(Acoswt + q (0) - K) cos(ot(Acosa)t + q(0) - K)
(23) u tt '— - X ~~;7
c 48 16y
And from this, Table I can be rendered, leading to the graph in figure
5.
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Table I
t u Notes
c_
(A + qJO) - K)
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±
)
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3ir
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This suggests that an expected utility- or profit-maximizing firm
will remain loyal to the cartel in the business upturn (0 to -s—t
a— to =—, . ..) and xrf.ll find it more attractive to cheat in the downturn2u 2m
,_tt 3rr .
4u t0 2w* *" ; '
I assumed previously that B„ = 0, that is, that the amount offered
at a discount did not affect the probability of detection. Figure 5
has been drawn on that assumption, and it is essential that we ask how
8pd
these results would fare if, as we expect, B 4 0, i.e., -— 4 0. It2 8qi
has been shown that the q. which maximizes the certainty equivalent
u is less than q.*. This means that by using q.* we have understated
the value of u . This is true at all points in figure 6 except at
—,
—
:, ..., where, by assumption, p. 0. At those points, and, pre-
sumably, near-by, for 6_ ^ 0, q = q *. Although we have no idea
how much we have understated u by our assumption on £«» we do know that
the results are only marginally sensitive to relaxing that assumption.
When p, = 1, even if q is only slightly different from zero, u will
still be less than u » The alterations will have to be made in the
TF 37T Sir
region of -r-, -r—
, y- , . . . , where previously u f = u halfway between the
peak and the trough of the cycle. For 3- j4 0, we shall have to push u
up somewhat so that breakdowns In the cartel will occur sooner than be-
fore and the reformation of the cartel will take place later than pre-
viously.
It bears mentioning again that this is a highly schematized render-
ing of the complexities of any collusion. Nonetheless, we have established
new principles for the examination of cartel behavior, and, in the model
given here, they appear to conform to the pattern of cartel success and
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failure noted in the references in section I, viz., that stability occurs,
if at all, in the upturn of the business cycle, and that instability
is the result of the pressures of the cyclical downturn.
IV.
This model is not open, I think, to the same objections which may
be directed at the accepted theory. It may, of course, be open to other
objections. For example, the assumption that the probability of enforcing
a fine on an offender is equal to or greater than one is overly strong.
There is, however, this to be said for it as a first approximation:
one would expect a firm to be more likely to pay a fine in an upturn,
when prospects are good, than in the downturn. This is because not paying
a fine may subject the offender to more lingering punishment which would
deny him a share of the booming market. For example, in the Joint Executive
Committee—a railroad cartel which flourished 1879-1893—a road which
failed to heed cartel sanctions lost part or all of an annual good faith
deposit and was denied the right to transfer freight with cartel members.
This isolation—or threat of isolation—was usually sufficient to bring a
miscreant back into the fold. A renegade who chose to fight the iso-
lating decree was forced to contemplate immense capital expenses in
order to build its own outlet to markets in the Midwest or on the sea-
board. Given that there was usually a long lag before such a building
project would be in service, the uncertain prospect in the market for
transport service several years thence further tempered the incentive
to fight enforcement.
See Ulen, supra note 6, for a full description of the workings of
this and other late 19th century rail d cartels.
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Other objections are certainly possible to the model. One might
wonder how the results would be altered if the marginal cost of pro-
duction and evasion—or of either separately—was an increasing, rather
than constant, function of output. The results derived in the previous
section would, 1 think, remain the same under this alternative assump-
tion. To see this, one can imagine what effect the imposition of a
capacity constraint would. have on the firm's output. Such a constraint
1 ft
will not eliminate cheating, but it will certainly mitigate it. I
believe it is obvious that the shifts in D which occur over the
m
business cycle serve, in the upturn, to make this constraint more and
more binding and thus, cheating less and less likely and vice versa in
the downturn.
Because the accepted theory does not recognize the possibility of
internally-generated stability in collusion in the short-run, it reduces
the difference between the long-run and the short-run simply to the
well-known difference between the competitive equilibria in those two
time periods. If one recognizes the possibility that the joint-profit-
maximum may be stable at certain points the short-run, as this model
suggests it may, then naturally the question rises, "'What will happen
to the stable collusion in the long-run?" I suggest that the cartel
will have severe trouble in maintaining the collective monopoly in the
long-run because of entry into the industry, encouraged by that very
See Ulen, op. cit., supra n. 6, for a formal proof of this contention.
Note again that the present results have been derived without assumption
of a capacity constraint.
-24-
Other objections are certainly possible to the model. One might
wonder how the results would be altered if the marginal cost of pro-
duction and evasion—or of either separately—was an increasing, rather
than constant, function of output. The results derived in the previous
section would, I think, remain the same under this alternative assump-
tion. To see this, one can imagine what effect the imposition of a
capacity constraint would have on the firm ! s output. Such a constraint
will not eliminate cheating, but it will certainly mitigate it. I
believe it is obvious that the shifts in D which occur over the
m
business cycle serve, in the upturn, to make this constraint more and
more binding and thus, cheating less and less likely and vice versa in
the downturn.
Because the accepted theory does not recognize the possibility of
internally-generated stability in collusion in the short-run, it reduces
the difference between the long-run and the short-run simply to the
well-known difference between the competitive equilibria in those two
time periods. If one recognizes the possibility that the joint-profit-
maximum may be stable at certain points the short-run, as this model
suggests it may, then naturally the question rises, "What will happen
to the stable collusion in the long-run?" I suggest that the cartel
will have severe trouble in maintaining the collective monopoly in the
long-run because of entry into the industry, encouraged by that very
See Ulen, op. cit., supra n. 6, for a formal proof of this contention.
Note again that the present results have been derived without assumption
of a capacity constraint.
-23-
failure noted in the references in section I, viz., that stability occurs,
if at all, in the upturn of the business cycle, and that instability
is the result of the pressures of the cyclical downturn.
IV.
This model is not open, 1 think, to the staie objections which may
be directed at the accepted theory. It may, of course, be open to other
objections. For example, the assumption that the probability of enforcing
a fine on an offender is equal to or greater than one is overly strong.
There is, however, this to be said for it as a first approximation:
one would expect a firm to be more likely to pay a fine in an upturn,
when prospects are good, than in the downturn. This is because not paying
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short-run success which the cartel has previously enjoyed. This points
up the fact that there are two different problems facing a collusion in
the two different periods. In the short-run, it is how to minimize the
incentive to cheat. In the long-run it is how to prevent entry. Or
alternatively, if entry can be prevented, it is how to prevent dispro-
portionate investment in capacity by the various partners in the collusion.
These are different sorts of problems, which, therefore, demand different
sorts of solutions.
I have not attempted to add these long-run considerations to the
model. There are some points worth mentioning in anticipation of
further work in this area. Clearly, one way of minimizing the threat
of entry is for the cartel to forego the joing maximum profits in favor
of a limit price, still somewhere above the competitive price. It is
not intutitively clear what effect this might have on the short-run
decisions of the members. If they believe that charging the limit price
greatly extends the ultimate life of the cartel, they may be more in-
clined to remain loyal than if they thought it would soon, because of
entry, be every man for himself.
It is widely-held that the only sort of policing which will effec-
tively maintain a collusion agreement is one backed by the power of
the state. The instances of these external enforcement devices are so
well-known as not to need rehearsing here. The implication of the model
is that it is possible for internal enforcement devices to serve the
See John T. Wenders, "Collusion and Entry," Journal of Political
Economy , 80 (1972).
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same role in promoting cartel stability. In fact, the manner in which
the model is constructed does not distinguish between these two differ-
ent sources of enforcement. It was intended to represent an internal
policy force. But clearly the model captures the cartel manager aspect
of government regulation as well. One can easily imagine that in a
state-enforced cartel the probability of enforcement is equal to one.
And the fine is simply the punishment handed out by a court or govern-
ment administrative agency.
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